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PERSONAL DEFENSES UNDER THE
GENEVA UNIFORM LAW ON BILLS OF

EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES:
A COMPARISON
BRUNO

H.

GREENE*

This paper has a narrow scope. Its aim is to examine the application
of art. 17 of the Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes of Geneva (subsequently referred to as U.L.) to a specific situation and to compare it with the legal principles applicable to the same
situation under Anglo-American law. As will be seen, art. 17 U.L. involves the question of admissibility of the acceptor's defenses, valid
against the drawer or other transferor, of a bill of exchange, in an
action brought by the transferee-holder. This article will not examine the
distinctions between "personal" and "real" defenses or the various types
of these defenses under continental legal concepts, but will confine itself
to a discussion of the interpretation of the applicable law, on the assumption of a specific type of defense: non-delivery or defectiveness of
merchandise or, expressed in our terms, failure of consideration or
breach of express or implied warranty. This defense was singled out
specifically in the discussions at the Geneva Conference which led to
the adoption of art. 17. By examining the meaning and interpretation
of that provision by legal scholars as well as courts of the most important signatories of the Convention and comparing the solutions envisaged by our own law, we may be able to explore a little more that
common ground which has to be found if unification of this area of law
is desired. But even opponents of unification may find it interesting to
examine the approach of a foreign system to a common legal problem.
Knowledge of other solutions may help to evaluate our own.
M sells defective goods to X. M issues a bill of exchange drawn on
X for the purchase price, payable to M's own order. X, ignorant as to
the condition of the goods, accepts. M negotiates the bill to A who takes
with notice of the defective character of the goods supplied by M to X.
Upon dishonor by X, A brings an action against him in which X interposes the defects of the goods purchased as a defense.
The availability of such a defense to X is governed in those countries which have adopted the Geneva Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange
and Promissory Notes (U.L.) by art. 17 of that law.'
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'The Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes (subsequently
referred to as U.L.) of June 7, 1930 is the product of an International Conference held at Geneva, Switzerland, from Mlay 13 to June 7, 1930. It was
ratified by Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands,
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Art. 17 reads: "Persons sued on a bill of exchange cannot set up
against the holder defenses founded on their personal relations with the
drawer or with previous holders, unless the holder, in acquiring the
bill, has knowingly acted to the detriment of the debtor."
In order to understand the meaning of this provision, it will first be
necessary to delimit art. 17 against the preceding art. 16 U.L. which
reads:
The possessor of a bill of exchange is deemed to be the lawful
holder if he establishes his title to the bill through an uninterrupted series of endorsements, even if the last endorsement is
in blank. In this connection, cancelled endorsements are deemed
not to be written (non 6crits). When an endorsement in blank is
followed by another endorsement, the person who signed this last
endorsement is deemed to have acquired the bill by the endorsement in blank.
Where a person has been dispossessed of a bill of exchange,
in any manner whatsoever, the holder who establishes his right
thereto in the manner mentioned in the preceding paragraph is
not bound to give up the bill unless he has acquired it in bad
faith, or unless in acquiring it he has been guilty of gross negligence. (Official English text)
It thus appears that art. 16 U.L. governs the protection of a holder
who acquired the instrument from a person having no title to it. The
holder will be protected even against the true owner (and, incidentally,
even where one or more endorsements in the chain leading to him have
been forged), unless, in acquiring the instrument, he acted in bad faith
or with gross negligence. On the other hand, art. 17 will govern where
the holder acquired good title but faces personal defenses by the obligor
which the latter could validly interpose in an action by the holder's
transferor or other predecessor. The holder will be protected under this
article, provided he did not knowingly act to the detriment of the debtor.
Hence, in our above example, art. 17 rather than art. 16 would apply.
Finland, Switzerland, Monaco, Portugal, France, the Soviet Union, Poland,
Brazil, Italy, Japan, Austria and Germany (then still unified). However,
ratification merely obligated the above countries to adopt national laws in
conformity with the provisions of the Uniform Law. Some countries (e.g.
Brazil and Belgium) have not complied with that obligation, even though they
ratified the Convention. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the Geneva
Convention itself provided for a large number of reservations which allowed
the signitories to disregard certain provisions of the Uniform Law within
their territories or to enact legislation not in conformity with it. Several
countries have made use of such reservations with respect to some provisions
of the law. The partial success of unification in the field of bills of exchange,
promissory notes and checks achieved at Geneva was due to the spadework
done at the previous two Conferences at The Hague (June 23-July 16, 1910
and June 15-July 23, 1912). The Second Conference produced an Agreement
which formed the basis for the Geneva discussions. The first World War
prevented its ratification. Several Latin American countries (Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela) as well as China (before the Communist revolution) adopted the Hague Agreement, rather than the Geneva
Uniform Law, as their law of bills of exchange. Turkey's law, likewise,
follows closely the Hague Agreement.
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We thus see a difference in approach with respect to the holder's
protection between the U.L. and the Anglo-American law. The protection by the latter is partly more and partly less extensive: 1. The AngloAmerican law protects only the bona fide purchaser for value, or the socalled holder in due course. But 2. If he meets the strict test of a holder
in due course, (being a "holder" as defined by law and satisfying the
requirements of good faith, payment of value, acquisition before maturity, etc.) he will be protected both against equities of ownership and
against personal defenses. Gross negligence, generally not considered
2
a sufficient test of bad faith will not deprive him of protection.
On the other hand, the holder under the U.L. never has to qualify
as a "holder in due course," as we define it. In order to keep the instrument as against the claim of the true owner, he must only be free from
bad faith and gross negligence. As for personal defenses, the wording
of art. 17 seems to imply that such will be cut off against a holder, even
if he knew of such defenses, as long as he did not in the acquisition of
it act to the detriment of the obligor.
The contrast in viewing the holder's protection through the unique
and single concept of the holder in due course as compared to differentiating such protection depending on the dangers which may threaten the
holder (i.e. claim of true owner on one hand and defenses of the debtor
on the other) did not always distinguish English law from the continental principles on which U.L. is based. As Professor Eugen Ulmer
points out in his historical study,3 English law at the time of Lord Holt,
i.e., at the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th century, had not
as yet fully developed the conception of the "negotiable instrument" and
treated the two sides of the holder's protection separately, much as the
European laws did.4 Not until Lord Mansfield's decisions in Miller v.
Race (1 Burr. 452, 97 E.R. 398), Grant v. Vaughan (3 Burr. 1516,
97 E.R. 957) and Peacock v. Rhodes (2 Doug. 633, 99 E.R. 402) was
the character of the negotiable instrument finally defined and the holder's
position circumscribed in one single concept of protection both of his
bona fide purchase and from defenses available against prior parties.5
It has been strongly asserted that a differentiation between the case
of lack of the transferor's title and a defense based on the personal relationship, outside of the instrument, between the obligor and the holder's transferor having good title is fully justified. Thus it is maintained
See infra, note 102 et seq.
Geschichtliche und rechtsvergleichende Studien zum englischen Wechselrecht
in Festgabe fuer Philipp Heck, Max Ruemelin, Arthur Benno Schmidt p. 178215 (1931).
4 Id. at 192-198. Prof. Ulmer explains at 204-205 that the reasons for such split
in the holder's protection under European laws are historical, since the idea
of cutting off defenses had been laid down by statute long before the protection of bona fide purchase was recognized.
5 Id. at 199.
2
3
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that the very nature of a negotiable paper requires that the holder should
not have to inquire into the extrinsic relations of his transferor to the
various obligors, because they simply are "none of his business," even
if he has notice of them.0 Only where the motive for the transfer is to
cheat the obligor by cutting off a patently well founded defense, this
motive being known to the purchaser, such defenses should be preserved
against the purchaser as fraud founded in the purchaser's own person.,
On the other hand, where the transferor did not have title, the purchaser
does not deserve the law's protection where he acted in bad faith, or even
with gross negligence, in the acquisition of the instrument.
However, the wording of art. 17 is by no means simple of interpretation, especially when it comes to the meaning of the words "unless the
holder, in acquiring the bill, has knowingly acted to the detriment of
the debtor." From the very beginning, i.e., the time of its discussion and
final adoption at the Geneva Conference, it has been considered a vague
provision and it has given rise to various and divergent explanations by
courts and legal writers alike." That the difficulties were foreseen at
Geneva, was illustrated by the following statement by Mr. Giannini, the
Italian delegate, who said: "Are you satisfied with this wording? No.
Will you vote for it? Yes. I shall vote for it because I do not like it.
But since no one likes it, this means without a doubt that this is the only
wording which can get all the votes." 9
The Background of Art. 17 U.L.
The Preliminary Draft of the First Hague Conference of 191010
provided that the party sued on a bill of exchange could interpose, in an
action by the holder, defenses based on his (the obligor's) relationship
with the drawer or prior holders, if the plaintiff had acted in bad faith
(mauvaise foi) in acquiring the instrument. However, the Second Hague
Conference of 1912 considered that provision too wide and, in art. 16
6 Hupka, Das einheitliche Wechselrecht der Genfer Vertraege 6 (1934).

7Ibid.
8 See e.g. Friedel, De l'inopposabilit6 des exceptions en xnati~re d'effets de
commerce (1951) who states at par. no. 99: ".... ont adopt6 une formule
intermediare, dont le sens exact est encore L d6terminer AI l'heure actuelle."
(They have adopted an intermediate formula, the meaning of which still
remains to be determined) See also Koessler, Zur Auslegung des Art. 17 des
Genfer Einheitlichen Wechselgesetzes in 1932/33 Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 277: "Es wurde .... der Wechselbalg einer Kautchukformel geschaffen, deren moeglicherweise verschiedenartige Auslegung in der Judikatur
der einzelnen Laender die einheitliche Anwendung des als einheitlich gedachten, nicht in die Regionen der sog. "Reserven" fallenden Art. 17 zu gefaehrden geeignet ist." (They created the bastard of a rubber formula, the
possibly differing interpretation of which by the courts of the individual countries may endanger the uniform interpretation of art. 17 which was designed
to be uniform and not to fall into the area of the so-called "reservations.")
9 Comptes rendus de ]a Conference Internationale pour l'unification du droit
en mati~re de lettres de change, billets
ordre et cheques [the Proceedings
of the Geneva Conference, subsequently referred to as C.R.] p. 294.
1OAvant-Projet d'une Convention sur l'Unification du droit relatif a ]a Lettre
de Change et au Billet LOrdre. 1910.
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of the Agreement," changed the wording to the effect that only a fraudulent conspiracy (entente frauduleuse) between the transferor and the
transferee of the instrument (to the detriment of the obligor) would
expose the transferee to such defenses.
The efforts toward a unification of the law of Bills of Exchange,
Promissory Notes and Checks, interrupted by the First World War,
were resumed in the early 1920's, mainly through the Comit6 tconomique of the League of Nations. That Committee first appointed a group
of 4 experts in 1923, whose findings convinced the Committee that a
unification, especially of the continental European laws with the AngloAmerican system, could not be expected at that stage. Nevertheless, it
resumed its efforts a few years later in the hope of bringing about at
least some unification among the laws of the continental system. Again
a group of experts, this time consisting of 10 members (among them
Mr. Ralph Dawson, Vice President of the Guaranty Trust Co. as the
American expert) was appointed in 1926 to study the problem. Their
findings 2 formed one of the important bases for the Geneva Convention.
These experts suggested that art. 16 of the Hague Agreement be
changed back to the form given it in the Preliminary Draft of the First
Hague Conference, i.e., so as to expose the holder to the defenses good
as against the drawer and prior holders, if such holder had acquired the
instrument in bad faith (mauvaise foi) rather than making the validity
of such defenses dependent on an "entente frauduleuse" between him
and his transferor. The reasons given by the experts for the suggested
change were: 1. that the notion of an "entente frauduleuse" was too
narrow and 2. the desire to harmonize the text of art. 16 with that of
the preceding art. 15 which provided for the recovery of an instrument
by the dispossessed true owner from a holder who had acquired it in
bad faith (mauvaise foi) or with gross negligence from one having no
title (eventually adopted in Geneva as art. 16). Thus, the experts paving
the way for the Geneva Conference believed that bad faith should be
the criterion both as to the protection of one acquiring from a person
having no title when sued by the true owner and to the question of letting in defenses in the case of acquisition from a legitimate holder.
The experts' suggestions were also submitted to the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law in Rome which, as far as
art. 16 was concerned, approved the change suggested, agreeing that
the words "entente frauduleuse" were too narrow. 3
At Geneva a group of delegates suggested adoption of the text (now
to become art. 17) as set out above. This proposal evoked an animated
112 Rglement Uniforme sur la Letre de Change et le Billet LOrdre. 1912.
' League of Nations. Documents Pr~paratoires. Projets elabor~s par les Experts

de ]a Soci&6 des Nations. 1929.
11.

13 Supra, note
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discussion which shows the great difficulties of interpretation that
haunted this provision from its inception and the differences of opinion
as to the most desirable regulation of this problem which the Swedish
delegate Mr. Ekeberg termed "one of the most important practical questions submitted for consideration of the Conference."' 4 It therefore
seems useful to summarize the views expressed at the Conference on
the matter:
1. The fundamental question was, obviously, whether mere notice
on the part of the acquirer, at the time of acquisition, of the existence of
valid defenses against his transferor would be sufficient to expose the
acquirer to the same defenses. The text of the proposed article evidently
aimed at excluding this consequence. For that reason the delegate of the
Netherlands (Mr. Molengraaff) eloquently opposed the adoption of the
proposed article, and favored the formulation framed by the Experts'
Committee. He pointed out that the proposed text actually protects the
bad faith acquirer who, in acquiring the instrument, is fully aware of
the fact that his transferor would be defeated by a valid defense of the
obligor against whom the acquirer is bringing the action. He insisted
that the law of bills of exchange does not aim at granting someone
something that is not due him. The law, he said, is based on the principle
of protection of third parties acting in good faith and will not permit a
bad faith acquirer to enrich himself unjustly. Such unjust enrichment
would be favored if the debtor were refused the right to invoke the acquirer's bad faith and were subjected to the burden of proving that the
acquirer had the malicious intent of causing him damage.' 5 The President of the Conference, Dr. J. Limburg, also expressed himself in favor
of admitting defenses known to the acquirer.' 6
This view was strenuously opposed by the representatives of Germany (Mr. Quassowski) Switzerland (Mr. Vischer) and Czechoslovakia (Mr. Hermann-Otavsky) who insisted that mere knowledge of
existing defenses should not be sufficient to expose the acquirer to those
defenses. The Czechoslovakian delegate cited a practical example" to
illustrate his position, similar to the hypothetical indicated at the beginning of this paper: M supplies defective goods to X and draws on X
for the purchase price to his own (M's) order. X accepts. In an action
by M against X, X could successfully interpose the defect as a defense.
Now, if we assume that the bill has been negotiated to A who has
knowledge of the situation at the time of acquisition, is he necessarily
exposed to the defense of breach of warranty or fraud? The delegate
answers the question in the negative, pointing out that A may have sufficient reasons to believe that the matter would be straightened out
'- C.R. p. 291.
25 C.R. p. 292.
16 Ibid.

17

Ibid.

1962-63]

PERSONAL DEFENSES

peaceably between the parties involved and that the acceptor would suffer no damage as a consequence of the payment of the bill. Thus, A
could, in spite of his knowledge of the defenses, be still a purchaser in
good faith.
These considerations finally won out and the article was adopted in
the form indicated. The Editorial Committee (Comit6 de Redaction)
commented in its summary that the Conference desired to indicate by
the wording of the article that it did not suffice that the holder knew
the defenses but that, in addition, he had to act knowingly to the detriment of the debtor in acquiring the instrument. The factual circumstances
necessary to make this latter forrhulation applicable (exceptio doll
generalis) were left to the discretion of the courts.' 8
2. The discussion, moreover, threw some light on how the delegates
understood the meaning of the words "acted knowingly to the detriment of the debtor," which was to become the subject of such conflicting interpretation.
Mr. Vischer, the Swiss delegate, proposed an amendment which
would have read: ". . . unless the holder, in acquiring the bill, acted
with the intent to do damage to the debtor, being aware of the defenses
which could be interposed against prior holders."
In the ensuing discussion, the Swedish delegate, Mr. Ekeberg, explained that this would mean, in other words, the requirement of "a
fact which imparts to the conduct of the acquirer the character of an
act contrary to good morals (contraire aux bonne moeurs)."'11 The German delegate, Mr. Quassowski, expressed his approval of the Swiss
amendment. 20 This, however, induced Mr. Asser, a member of the
Netherlands delegation, to inquire whether the purpose of the amendment was to indicate that it would not be sufficient for the holder to
act knowingly to the detriment of the debtor, but that he would moreover have to have the intent to do damage, 21 whereupon Mr. Vischer
replied that, in his estimation, the will to do damage was expressed even
in the originally proposed formulation of the article, while his amendment merely aimed at expressing the necessity of the holder's awareness
22
of the defenses which could be interposd against the prior holders.
Finally, the Conference rejected the amendment and adopted art. 17
as originally submitted to it and as it now reads.
Art. 17 U.L. in court decisions and literature.
1.France.
In view of the position taken by the Geneva Conference it would
seem that 1. mere knowledge of defenses on the part of the acquirer
18

C.R. p. 133 no. 45.

29 C.R. p.291.
20

Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.
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valid against prior parties would not expose him to such defenses and
2. a fortiori, that negligent failure to obtain such knowledge would in
no way adversely affect his position.
But, actually, the proposition is far from obvious. The French courts
had, prior to the changes made pursuant to the adoption of the Geneva
U.L., followed the principle that protection was to be given only to a
bona fide purchaser and, at least the majority held that knowledge of
the existence of such defenses on the part of the purchaser was sufficient23
to qualify him as a bad faith holder and expose him to such defenses.
They hesitated to depart from that position. It should be pointed out,
however, that the prevailing view ;f the majority was not shared, even
before adoption of the U.L., by all French scholars. Thus Lyon-Caen
and Renault, to cite the most outstanding ones, declare: "This opinion
seems to us to be contrary to the spirit of the law in this area; the
debtor is under a direct obligation to the holder and must pay, unless he
proves against such holder that he not only knew such a defense as the
debtor could have availed himself of, but that he has made himself an
accomplice to a veritable fraud designed to obtain payment which could
otherwise have been refused. '24 (Translation mine) Thus we find the
concept of an "entente frauduleuse" spelled out in 1907 which later became incorporated into art. 16 of the Hague Agreement and which, in
the view of many, still governs the differently worded provision of art.
17 U.L. In fact, some French decisions seem to bear out the authors'
opinion, but they23are in the minority as compared to the ones holding
the opposite view.
But the French courts went even further. Both before and after the
enactment of the U.L., decisions of French courts, including the Cour
de Cassation, held that a holder did not act in good faith where he could
1 Lescot et Roblot, Les Effets de Commerce 343 (1953) and cases cited there
at note 3. See also Bouteron, La Jurisprudence du Cheque 1865-1937, p. 151
et seq. (1937) and 4 Lyon-Caen et Renault, Trait6 de Droit Commercial 117
(4th ed. 1907) as well as Tr.Comm. (Tribunal Commercial) Le Havre, May
3, 1937, Rec. (Recueuil) du Havre 37 1 12 and Cour d'Appel Lyon, May 30,
1938, Rec. somm. (Recueuil mensuel des sommaires de la jurisprudence
frangaise) 27 no. 2575, cited in Caemmerer, Internationale Rechtsprechung
zum Genfer einheitlichen Wechsel-und Scheckrecht 130-131 (1954) How
much French courts vacillate in the interpretation of this provision, can
perhaps best be seen from two decisions of the Court of Montpellier, one of
which required merely knowledge of the defenses by the transferee (March
19, 1951, J.C.P. (Jurisclasseur Pgriodique et Semaine Juridique) 1951.IV.112)
while another required complicity between transferor and transferee (Nov. 9,
1950, D. (Dalloz) 1951. Somm. 23) to establish the latter's bad faith.
24 Supra, note 23 at 117.
25 See cases cited in Lescot et Roblot, supra, note 23 at 343 note 5. See also
Friedel, supra note 8, who states at p. 148 (no. 102) that the greater part of
those decisions (i.e. the ones which seem to bear out the views of Lyon-Caen
and Renault) "maintain that the establishment of a collusion is sufficient to
declare that the holder acted in bad faith but do not say that only such
collusion determines bad faith. See also cases cited by Friedel at p. 147, notes
3-8.

23
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have discovered the defect inherent in the instrument, thus exposing
him to personal defenses valid against prior holders, on the basis of his
gross negligence in failing to discover those defenses. In the light of
these decisions, the statement by Professors Lyon-Caen and Renault
that "it is, at least, certain that even gross negligence of the holder must
not allow him to be treated as a holder in bad faith"26 does not seem to
have been borne out. As late as 1947 the Cour de Cassation allowed personal defenses against a holder based on the latter's gross negligence in
acquiring the instrument. In that case the plaintiff had purchased some
bills of exchange which had become due almost 12 years before the
purchase and the dishonor of which had not been protested. In the
meantime the underlying debt had been extinguished. The Cour de
Cassation held that the holder should have noticed that the instruments
were 12 years old and had not been protested. Hence, even though he
did not conspire fraudulently with the drawer, he should have inquired
about the reasons of the drawer's inactivity of many years and, at any
rate, should have contacted the drawee. His failure to do so meant that
27
he "acted knowingly to the detriment of the debtor."
A more recent French case should be mentioned as significant for
our problem. In that case 28 the court declared that the rule that defenses
based on the relation between the drawee and the drawer cannot be invoked against the holder becomes inapplicable "if the holder, in acquiring the bill, had knowledge of the damage caused the drawee-acceptor
by putting him (the acceptor) through his (the holder's) act to a disability of interposing successfully the defenses based on his personal
relations with the drawer." Is this the equivalent of "acting knowingly
to the detriment of the debtor ?" From the wording it is not clear whether
the court means that the holder must have concrete knowledge of the
actual damage which would accrue to the debtor or merely knowledge
that, by his purchase, the defenses will be cut off, which in itself constitutes damage to the debtor. If the court means the latter, then it
comes very close to allowing defenses merely where the holder is aware
of their existence.2 9
French legal literature likewise found itself facing a problem the
solution of which seemed practically impossible. Somehow the words
26 Supra, note 23.
27 Cass. req. (Cour de Cassation, Chambre de Requites) April 29, 1947, J.C.P.
27.11.3602; S. (Sirey) 48.1.113 (cited in Caemmerer, supra note 23 at 131).
Note that the question of losing the qualifications of a holder in due course
by acquiring an overdue instrument does not have the same significance
2 8 under the U.L. as under English and American law.
Trib. Comm. de la Seine, Jan. 26, 1959, D.56.somm.139.
29The Cour de Cassation similarly interpreted the meaning of "acting knowingly
to the detriment of the debtor" in its decision of June 26, 1956 Gaz.Pal.
(Gazette du Palais) 1956.2.331; J.C.P. 1956.11.1960; Rev.trim. dr. comm.
(Revue trimestrielle du droit commercial) 1957, 147. See also Cour d'Appel
Paris, Feb. 2, 1957, Gaz. Pal. 1957.1.273.
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"acting knowingly to the detriment of the debtor" had to be explained.
Not only were they there, but the Editorial Committee had itself declared what the words were not supposed to mean, namely mere knowledge of defenses on the part of the purchaser. A European continental
legal writer is used to interpreting statutes and will not wait until some
court will explain what the words mean. It is frequently the courts
which expect the "doctrine" to tell them what a statute means before
they are faced with having to hand down an opinion. As was to be expected, each of a number of writers presented his own theory as to what
those words should mean, no matter how unconvincing some of those
theories seemed to be.
Under one of them, for example, it is conceded that a priorithe fact
alone that an instrument is acquired with knowledge of the debtor's
valid defenses, is sufficient to let those defenses in against the purchaser,
because the acquisition in spite of such knowledge must necessarily cause
damage to the debtor.30 But, if so, then the text means exactly what the
Editorial Committee said it must not mean, which cannot be. So, art. 17
means, according to this theory, that the holder will be subject to a personal defense of the debtor only where the acquisition of the instrument
would, but for this provision, have had the effect of cutting off a defense
which the debtor would have certainly interposed against the transferor.3 1 The author admits that it will be almost impossible to prove that
the holder really knew that the debtor would have interposed a certain
defense in an action brought by the transferor. He, therefore, suggests
reliance on presumptions, pointing out that in certain cases the court
will assume the holder's intent to act to the detriment of the debtor because it would, under the given circumstances, be impossible to contend
that the holder might have believed the debtor would not have made use
of his defense. Where, on the other hand, such presumption should not
be warranted, other elements would have to be considered to determine
whether or not the holder believed that the debtor would interpose the
30 Friedel, supra note 8 at 153. Friedel cites (note 3) the remark made by Mr.

Giannini, Italy's representative at Geneva, to the effect that art. 17 aims at
the holder who acquired the instrument with the intent to prevent the debtor
from availing himself of his defenses (C.R.p. 293) and that this notion was
narrower than an intent to harm the debtor, which would spell out fraud.
Friedel adds: "It is not apparent why he [the holder] would be interested in
having it [the instrument] endorsed to him, if not with the intent to prevent
the debtor from availing himself of his means of defense."
31d. at 154. In support of his view the author cites both Staub-Stranz, Kommentar zum Wechselrecht 231, 234 (1934) and Arminjon et Carry, La Lettre
de Change et le Billet a Ordre 372 (1938). However, it is submitted that the
reference to those two treatises is based on a misunderstanding. Staub-Stranz
merely state that the defenses are let in where the purchaser has certain
knowledge of the existence of those defenses at the time he acquires the instrument. They do not require knowledge by the transferee that the debtor
would have certainly interposed such defenses as a prerequisite for letting
them in against such transferee. Arminjon et Carry quote Staub-Stanz for
the same proposition.
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32
defense which he (the holder) would be cutting off by his acquisition.
It is submitted that this interpretation, in addition to being artificial,
does not seem to do justice to the intent of the framers and to the wording of art. 17. Its practical applicability seems even more doubtful.
Another author 33 feels equally reluctant to concede that no significance should be attached to the unworkable formula contained in art. 17.
He also suggests a distinction depending on circumstances, particularly
on the type of defense involved. Thus he would consider mere knowledge of the existence of the defense sufficient to let it prevail against
the holder where such defense arises from the underlying "causa" or
is based on a defect of an instrument signed in blank or on discharge
by payment, while not allowing it for other defenses (e.g. accommodation or set-off and counterclaim). This approach, while, in this writer's
opinion, systematically misconceived, is based on a far better understanding as to the significance of "knowledge of defenses" than other
theories and approaches much more closely, at least in the ultimate
effect, the viewpoint of the American law.
Professor Houin, after discussing the "hesitations" of French courts
in this matter, stated what he believes the statute requires to consider
the holder as acting knowingly to the detriment of the debtor: "Knowledge of the defect is not enough. He (the holder) must have been conscious of the fact that he would cause damage to the drawee-acceptor
if the latter could not interpose such defect at the time the instrument
becomes due."34 (Translation mine) However, he adds, quite correctly,
that, as a practical matter, it will be a rare instance where the holder's
consciousness of damaging the drawee can be proved directly. In most
cases, he feels, such proof will result from presumptions drawn from
the relationship between the holder and the drawer (or prior holder)
and the evaluation of such presumptions by the courts will necessarily
be very difficult.3 It seems clear that a requirement of intent of "causing harm to the debtor" on the part of the holder has not clarified art. 17
to any appreciable extent. Professor Georges Ripert appears, therefore,
quite justified in stating that "the consciousness of damage can hardly
3
be distinguished from the simple knowledge of the defenses."
2. Switzerland.
While the lower Swiss courts are not quite clear in some of theirrare decisions on this point as to the actual meaning of "knowingly acting to the detriment of the debtor," the prevailing view, as expressed by
32

Id. at 159.

33 Schneider, Essai d'une 6tude comparative en droit franqais et en droit allemand

du principe de l'inopposabilit6 des exceptions en mati~re de lettre de change
avant et depuis la Conference de Gen~ve 224-227 (1937).
34 Annotation to Cour 'dAppel Paris, July 4, 1957, D.1958.156, 157.
35 Ibid.
36 2 Trait6 6lementaire de droit commercial 54 (1960).
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the highest Swiss Federal Court, is to the effect that the holder acts in
bad faith where he knew, at the time of the acquisition of the instru37
ment, that the debtor had defenses against his transferor.
However, one Swiss author disagrees with this interpretation of the
Swiss Supreme Court and, contrary to ideas expressed by himself as
co-author of an earlier work 3 8 he adopts and develops, in a contribution
published in 195539, the views expounded by Friede 4 0 and Schneider.41
He now considers the provision of art. 17 meaningful as requiring, in
addition to knowledge of the existence of defenses, also the "consciousness of causing a harm to the debtor" on the part of the holder. Such
knowledge will be present, in the author's opinion, where the holder
is not only convinced of the justification of the defenses, but also knows
that the debtor would have certainly interposed them against the transferor, which is the theory developed by Friedel. Using the example
adopted as an illustration at the Geneva Conference and stated above,
he contends that, in the situation described, the holder need not have
acted knowingly to the detriment of the debtor, although he knew that,
for example, the merchandise had not been delivered, since he could
assume that the differences would be amicably settled before the instrument became due. Therefore, he could not be certain that the defense
would have been interposed by the debtor against the claim of the
transferor.
It has already been pointed out above that this theory seems of little
practical value and could be carried into effect only on the basis of highly artificial presumptions. Moreover, as stated by Staub-Stranz,42 the
example used merely circumscribes in greater detail the type of knowledge of defenses on the part of the transferee which will or will not
destroy his good faith, but it does not introduce any new element, without which his good faith will be preserved. In other words, where the
holder has knowledge of existing defenses, he usually assumes that such
defenses will still be in existence at the time the instrument becomes due.
If they are not, the holder will prevail, not because he acted in good
faith, but because there are no defenses which can be interposed against
him or against any transferor. If, at the time he acquires the instrument,
he has valid reasons to believe that those defenses will disappear at the
time the instrument becomes due, then it might be argued that such is
not "knowledge of defenses" in its true meaning. The evaluation of such
"knowledge" would have to be left to judicial determination in the indi3 BGE (Entscheidungen des Schweizer Bundesgerichts) 54 II 41, 56 II 294.

Arminjon et Carry, supra,note 31.
9 Aequitas und Bona Fides. Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag von August Sinionius
40 29-40 (1955).
Supra, note 8.
38
3

41 Supra, note 33.
42

Supra, note 31 at 232.
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vidual case. But the factual situation envisaged is certainly not common.
It would, therefore, seem unjustified to abolish knowledge of defenses
generally as a criterion of good faith only because of the possibility that
43
such a situation might arise.

3. Germany.
Very few German cases seem to have dealt with our problem since

44
cites two
the adoption of the Uniform Law. However, Caemmerer

cases 45 which give some indication of the courts' attitude, even though
the opinions may not be conclusive. In the first one the Reichsgericht
held that "knowingly acting to the detriment of the debtor" means that
the holder must have known the defenses at the time of acquisition of
the instrument. Since the defendant could not prove such knowledge,
the case was decided for the plaintiff. Thus, the court does not seem to
have reached the question as to whether, if proven, such knowledge
alone would have been sufficient to deprive the plaintiff of his standing
as a bona fide holder. In the other case, decided by an appellate court,
our problem was likewise not material to the decision of the case, since
knowledge was acquired after the time of acquisition. However, even
though dictum, the court's interpretation of art. 17 is interesting. In
the court's opinion, art. 17 requires malicious intent ("Arglist") which
the court considers present where knowledge of the defenses was obtained at the time of acquisition of the instrument.
With virtually no support from the courts, German legal literature
has been fairly eloquent on the interpretation of art. 17. As in the other
countries which adopted the Uniform Law, the formula proved extremely vexing to German writers and the usual two opposite lines of approach developed, with some scholars trying to read some sense into the
provision and others boldly cutting the Gordian knot and, in effect, admitting its unworkability.
One commentary, 46 for example, repeats the standard statement that
"mere kpaowledge, on the part of the acquirer, of the existence of defenses is not sufficient" and adds: "In addition, there must be present
the consciousness of damaging the debtor." This is explained by saying
that the acquirer must realize that he is depriving the debtor of his defenses through his acquisition of the instrument and must have incorporated this consequence in his intent, either by wanting to bring about
such consequence or by taking the risk that such consequence would
follow. But, the author continues, if the debtor proves that the holder,
43 Cf. Ribi, Von der Uebertragung der Wertpapiere. Zuercher Beitraege zur
Rechtswissenschaft, Neue Folge, Heft 218 (1959) and Koessler, supra, note 8.
44 Supra, note 23 at 129, 130.
45 RG (Reichsgericht) II 283/33 (1934) and OLG (Oberlandesgericht) Breslau
8 U 1739/39 (1940).
46 Baumbach-Hefermehl, Wechselgesetz und Scheckgesetz, Beck'sche Kurzkommentare v.26, p. 112 (6th ed. 1959).
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at the time of the acquisition, knew the facts which led to the detriment
of the debtor, then "experience in life" (Lebenserfahrung) presumes intent on the part of the acquirer and the latter must rebut such presumption. By way of illustration the authors assert that no intent to inflict
damage need be present where the acquirer could expect that the
debtor would take successful recourse against another (which is the
theory similar to the one adovcated by Lenhoff41 7 and Valeri4 s ) or where
the acquirer believed that the debtor would not wish to interpose his
defenses.
There is a strange inconsistency in the arguments advanced by the
followers of this group. On the one hand it is asserted that the holder
should be protected and cannot be expected to pay any attention to the
relationships of his transferor to other parties,49 on the other hand his
good or bad faith is made dependent on whether or not he had reason
to believe that the debtor would recoup his loss elsewhere or whether he
really intended to interpose his good defenses, all of which depends on
knowledge of extrinsic circumstances, the obtaining of which might require considerable investigation.
A position similar to the one described above was recently taken in
a very thorough doctoral dissertation. 50 The author disagrees with Jacobi's 9 ' belief that "knowledge of the defense is equal to knowledge of
the debtor's detriment" and contends that art. 17 requires that the holder
must have drawn the conclusion from his knowledge of the defenses
that the debtor would be damaged, even though not requiring an intent
on the holder's part to damage the debtor. He concedes that proof of
such mental process of the holder will be difficult and admits that the
holder will rarely have sufficient legal knowledge to draw a precise conclusion from the principle of "cutting off defenses." Nevertheless, he
insists that the holder must have "formed ideas of some kind" as to
the damaging effect upon the debtor of his acquisition of the instrument. He also admits that the holder would at least have to be familiar
with the principle of "cutting off defenses" (to draw any conclusions
at all) and that such principle is by no means widely known. The only
solution of these problems is seen in the recourse to presumptions by
the courts.
Again the question arises: Would the holder acquire the instrument
if he did not believe that the debtor's defenses, of which he is fully
aware, will be cut off with respect to him? And, if he does, isn't he just
47
1nfra, note 67.
48
lnfra, note 73. See also Gaehler, Die Einwendungen des Schuldners nach dem
neuen Wechseliund Scheckgesetz 81 (1934).
49 Hupka, supra, note 6 and infra, note 62.
50 Henrichs, Der Schutz des gutglaeubigen Wechselerwerbers nach dem einheitlichen Wechselgesetz der Genfer Vertraege unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Rechtsentwicklung in den Vertragsstaaten 179-181 (1960).
51 Infra, note 59.
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as aware of the fact that such exclusion of defenses must accrue to the
debtor's detriment?
As a consequence, a number of German scholars refused to go along
with the unconvincing attempts at an artificial interpretation of art. 17.
As early as 1932 one writer stated: ". . . After protracted discussions,
a compromise was reached in the preceding formula which, however,
will not fully satisfy the requirements of commerce. It will force him
who knows of the existence of defenses which the debtor cannot interpose against him to abstain from the acquisition [of the instrument],
because it may be claimed that he had knowledge of the detriment
caused the debtor by the transfer. .... ,,52
Staub-Stranz agree and state:
"... For the acquisition of the bill of exchange in spite of such knowledge contains in itself the intent to cause detriment to the debtor ....,,13
Subsequently, i. Stranz repeated this statement even more clearly by
saying: "In case of certain knowledge of the existence of defenses
against his transferor, the purchaser acts with knowledge that the debtor
would suffer a detriment through the transfer of the rights arising out
of the instrument, if the defense were to be cut off thereby."54 He adds,
however, that such knowledge must be accompanied by the knowledge
that such defenses are justified. 55 But the "assumption that the debtor
might take recourse elsewhere, does not preclude [the purchaser's]
consciousness of causing a detriment."56
Staub-Stranz see the significance of the clause only in cases of recourse, when the original transferor becomes a re-acquirer on the basis
of his obligation founded in the endorsement. Since, under those circumstances, he does not re-acquire of his own free will, any knowledge
of defenses which he may have obtained between the time of the original
transfer and that of the re-acquisition, will not affect his position, unless he acts in collusion with the holder and with the fraudulent intent
to cut off defenses which the debtor might have had directly against
such holder. 57 The same authors, therefore, conclude that ". . . in the
normal case, the intent of the participants in the Conference to add
something else to the requirement of knowledge would seem to have
remained unfulfilled and the sense of the present version would consist
only in a narrow definition of the concept of knowledge, hence in excluding every kind of negligence." 8
But the most convincing and best stated position with respect to this
problem was taken by Professor Jacobi, the leading German scholar in
52 Michaelis, Wechselrecht 390 (1932).

Supra, note 31 at 232.
54 Wechselrecht Kommentar 122 (14th ed. 1952).
55 Id. at 123.
56 Supra, note 54. See also Jacobi, infra,note 59.
57 Supra, note 31 at 232-233.
5 Id. at 232.
5
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this field of law. 59 His interpretation of art. 17 is, in essence, as follows: The intentionally caused detriment provided for by art. 17 is
present where the parties to the endorsement consciously deprive the
debtor of his existing defenses. Such consciousness on the part of the
transferee is sufficient. It may not suffice that this consciousness extend merely to the knowledge that "all unknown personal defenses are
cut off" by the transfer, because such is "normal" knowledge, i.e. the
regular effect of any endorsement. What art. 17 requires is the "abnormal" knowledge of "a specific defense." What, then, must, according to Jacobi, be the mental process of the holder, in order to expose
him to the exception of art. 17? He must have reached the conclusion
from the facts known to him that such facts constitute a defense which
the debtor will lose through the transfer. But, Jacobi adds, since the
holder will not frequently be a lawyer, it must suffice that he believe
that, because of the facts known to him, the debtor may have some
remedy against the claim, even though he does not understand the significance and effects of such remedy. Hence, Jacobi, too, reaches the
conclusion that, in practially all circumstances, "knowledge of the defenses is equal to knowledge of the debtor's detriment."
4. Austria.
Among the decisions of Austrian courts dealing with our problem
we again find the familiar "beating around the bush," i.e., dicta to the
effect that mere knowledge of existing defenses is not sufficient to make
them valid against the transferee and, at the same time, allowing the
defenses, even though the facts disclosed no more than knowledge. 6
In the Austrian literature we see positions at the extremes of the
problem discussed. At the one extreme it is asserted that the new formula adopted at Geneva in art. 17 means, when examined in the "light
59 Wechsel-und Scheckrecht unter Beruecksichtigung des auslaendischen Rechts
86 et seq. (1956).
60 See infra, note 73.
61 E.g. the Austrian Supreme Court held for the defendant acceptor who had
bought a cow from the drawer and, when sued by the indorsee, interposed
defenses based on warranty of the animal's soundness and on the indorsee's
knowledge of the defects at the time of acquisition of the instrument. The
court, while repeating the standard assertion that mere knowledge on the
part of the transferee of the causal relationship existing between the drawer
and drawee was not sufficient, reasoned that "acting knowingly to the detriment" consisted in the transferee's knowledge of the detriment accruing to
the debtor (througiv the transfer) plus the transferee's willingness to accept
that risk. The court also makes a very interesting distinction between "detriment" and "damage" and explains that it is sufficient if the debtor is to
suffer a "detriment to his rights" whereas actual damage is not required:
4 Ob (Oberster Gerichtshof) 44/36,OGZ (Entscheidungen des Obersten
Gerichtshofes in Zivilsachen) XVIII 77 (1936). Note also the definition given
by OLG Wien (Oberlandesgericht Vienna) 7 R 844/35, Ev.Bl. (Evidenzblatt
der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen) 1935 no. 1034 which stated: "Knowingly
acting to the detriment of the debtor means not mere knowledge of circumstances which imply that defenses against the bill of exchange mnight exist
(emphasis added), but absolute certainty is required."
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of day," nothing more than the old "entente frauduleuse" (fraudulent
conspiracy), since an act knowingly damaging the debtor can hardly be
visualized without such collusion between transferor and holder.62 The
author adds that, at any rate "the discussion established with full clarity that mere knowledge by the transferee of the existence of the defense does not suffice to render such defense effective against the holder,
but that the acquisition must, moreover, appear as a violation of good
morals (Verstoss gegen die guten Sitten).63
Another Austrian scholar" develops a more complex theory, very
similar to the one advocated by Georges Friedel6 5 and Will Schneider."6
According to Stanzl, the holder, in order to be subject to personal defenses valid as against a transferor, must have known of the debtor's
detriment at the time of the acquisition of the instrument and, because
of such knowledge, his action is contrary to good morals. However,
whether or not the holder realized that he was causing harm to the debtor
by the acquisition, cannot be ascertained, since that is a "psychic phenomenon." Hence, the determination as to whether or not the holder's
action was contrary to good morals under the circumstances, must be
made according to views prevailing in the trade. Thus, the application
of the formula depends on the type of defense: 1. If the detriment follows naturally from the facts underlying the defense, the circumstances
that the holder knew (or should have known) of its existence, will be
sufficient to expose him to the defense, e.g. where he knows that the
debtor could have interposed the defense of usury against the transferor
which he loses through the transfer. 2. On the other hand, where the
detriment does not follow as a logical consequence of the facts constituting the defense, additional facts must be present from which the
holder can deduce the debtor's detriment in case of a transfer of the
instrument, e.g. where the holder knows only that the debtor has claims
arising out of warranty based on the underlying transaction. In such
a case, the author feels, knowledge of the defense does not necessarily
imply knowledge of the detriment to the debtor which would follow the
transfer of the instrument.
It is submitted that the distinction drawn by the author does not seem
too convincing. It is not clear why knowledge of one type of defense
62

Hupka, supra note 6 at 52. The same author opposed the substitution of

"mauvaise foi" (bad faith) for the Hague formula of "entente frauduleuse"
(fraudulent conspiracy). One of the reasons given for his position was that
it would be "intolerable" for commerce if mere knowledge of a defense which
arose outside of the instrument and which as such should not concern the
transferee, could nullify the latter's claim based on the instrument: Hupka,
Zur Revision des Haager Wechselrechtes 11 (1930) Cf. Bigiavi, infra note
78 at 182, 183.
63 Supra, note 6 at 52.
64 Stanzel, Boeser Glaube im Wechselrecht 41 et seq. (1950).
65 Supra, note 8.
66 Supra, note 33.
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necessarily implies knowledge of the detriment, while knowledge of
another type does not.
Another, rather interesting, interpretation of art. 17 is based on the
following reasoning: While mere knowledge of defenses (e.g. defects
of the merchandise furnished by the drawer to the acceptor) is not sufficient for the application of the exception, the holder's good faith will
be destroyed where he must reckon with the possibility of the debtor's
detriment because, for example, he had reason to believe at the time of
the acquisition of the instrument, that the acceptor would not be able
to recoup his losses from the drawer because of the latter's absence of
financial responsibility. 67 However, does the holder act less to the detriment of the debtor if he believes that the latter may, at some future
time, be able to recoup from the transferor what he had to pay out on
the instrument? The detriment is caused by the fact that the debtor
loses his defenses as a result of the transfer of the instrument. The
distinction made by the Austrian Supreme Court s between "detriment"
and "damage" seems very much in point in this connection. The law,
by its very wording, does not consider only material damages, but rather
an infringement of the debtor's rights. Absent the transfer, he could
interpose his defense against the transferor immediately and would not
have to bring a separate action against him. The loss of those defenses
is the detriment which the holder causes him, since he knows that they
will be cut off by the transfer. 69 The succinct statement of the author of
a brief German treatise on Negotiable Instruments"0 seems quite applicable. He says: "For all practical purposes the proof of knowledge
of the defense will, as a rule, be sufficient, for he who acquires the bill
of exchange usually wants to collect it. If, however, he wants to collect
it in spite of a defense known to him, he knows that he is damaging the
debtor."
5. Italy.
In the interpretation of art. 17 U.L. (which is art. 21 l.c., i.e. Legge
Cambiaria, the Italian law of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes)
two phases have to be distinguished: 1. The time up to the enactment
of the new Italian Civil Code and 2. the period since that enactment.
The reason for the distinction is the fact that art. 1993 of the new Civil
Code contains a general regulation, applicable to all negotiable instruments, which declares personal defenses available against a holder where
67

Lenhoff, Einfuehrung in das einheitliche Wechselrecht 5, 6 (1933).

68 Supra, note 61.

See also Jacobi, supra note 59 at 87, note 5 who disputes Valeri's theory
(infra, note 73) which is quite similar to Lenhoff's. Jacobi points out that the
debtor is damaged by the endorsement, at least for the time being. True, he
may be able to recoup his damage from the endorser, but "money which
the debtor keeps in his pocket is worth more than a claim against the transferor-indorser."
70 Hueck, Recht der Wertpapiere 91 (1957).
69
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the latter has acted "intentionally" to the detriment of the debtor, rather
than "knowingly," as used in art. 17 U.L. and art. 21 l.c. There is considerable controversy among Italian legal writers as to whether art.
1993 Cod. Civ. is to be considered as interpretative of art. 21 l.c. We
shall subsequently consider that controversy quite briefly. However, the
majority of scholars as well as courts believe that the same significance
is to be attributed to the two legal provisions and that "knowingly" and
"intentionally" have the same meaning.
An examination of the Italian legal literature and decision law reveals the same confusion and absence of unanimity as to the real significance of the clause in question which we find in Germany and in
France. We again encounter the difficulty of explaining the true meaning of the nebulous phrase "acting knowingly to the detriment of the
debtor." Every purchaser of an instrument who knows that the debtor
has personal defenses against his transferor, also knows that, by acquiring this instrument, he will deprive him of such defenses, hence
will act to his detriment. He would not acquire it if he did not expect
to recover the amount due, free from such defenses. 71 But. if that were
so, knowledge of the existence of the defenses would be sufficient to
make them available against the holder, which the framers of the U.L.
wanted to exclude. It has therefore been contended that the application
of the clause under examination requires that the purchaser must, in
acquiring the instrument, have had the intent to do harm to the debtor
(which seems to go beyond "acting knowingly to the detriment of the
debtor") by depriving him of the only means of avoiding a payment of
money he did not owe. It is therefore asserted that the purchaser must
have the intent to cause the debtor irreparabledamage, knowing that the
debtor will be unable to recoup his loss from anyone at any time. If he
believes that the debtor can recover the purchase price for the defective
merchandise, which he has had to pay to the holder, from the seller or
from someone else, he acquires the instrument free from the debtor's
7
defense and in good faith. 1
See on this point, supra note 69.
2 Angeloni, La Cambiale e il Vaglia Cambiario 164-168 (1934), quite similar to
the position taken by Valeri, infra, note 73 and Lenhoff, supra, note 67. See
also De Semo, Diritto Cambiario, 658, 659 (1953) who requires, for the application of the exception, that there be an intent to harm on the part of the
transferee, a disloyal behavior which is contra bonos mores. He relies on art.
1993 Code Civ. (1942) and the change of wording. ("intenzionalmente" replacing "scientemente") for support of his views. This theory has been stated
most precisely by Ascarelli in 5 Novissimo Digesto Italiano, Title "Cambiale"
(p. 739, 740) (1958) and may be summarized as follows: 1. Since the transferee acquires a claim independent of any relationship outside of the instrument (which is based on the prevailing theory of the "abstract character
of the obligation") his knowledge of defenses is immaterial, as a general
rule. 2. However, the law grants an exception where the purchaser in acquiring
the instrument has been conscious of "causing the debtor an irreparable harm,
preventing him from recouping the damage from the transferor on the basis
of their personal relationship, e.g. because of the latter's insolvency." Ascarelli

71
7
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Reference should be made at this point to the theory stated by another Italian author, 73 even though it is virtually the same as the one
just described, because of a more specifically circumscribed argument
which he introduces and which, at first blush, seems rather convincing.
He reasons: knowledge by the holder of the debtor's defenses is not
sufficient, because the loss of such defenses is the normal effect of any
transfer of a negotiable instrument. Hence, what is required is knowledge of the creation of an abnormal effect, viz. of the accrual of an
irreparabledamage for the debtor, so that such debtor is left with no
possibility of recouping his loss from the transferor (e.g. because of the
latter's insolvency).
This reasoning appears to be misleading. The author seems to confuse knowledge of a principle of law with knowledge of existing facts.
"Knowledge of defenses" obviously does not mean knowledge that the
debtor's defenses, if any, will be cut off by the transfer of the instrument to a (bona fide) purchaser. This is knowledge of a principle of
law. It means knowledge of specific facts which constitute a defense for
the debtor and which, to follow the author's terminology, will produce
4
the "abnormal" effect of destroying the purchasers' good faith.
These theories are contradicted by other writers75 who reject the idea
of an intent to cause irreparable damage as going beyond the context of
the law. Instead, it is asserted that it is not the will to do harm to the
debtor that is significant, but the desire, on the part of the acquirer, to
offer a benefit to the transferor, even if such benefit may result in damage to the debtor. If the agreement between transferor and acquirer
rests on the exclusive ground of the latter's wish to save the transferor
from a defense which the debtor could have interposed against him, then
such agreement is voided by the statute.
The last discussed theory looks very much like the old "entente
frauduleuse" which was explicitly rejected at Geneva as a criterion for
the application of art. 17. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the holder's
mental processes could be as minutely ascertained as this theory seems
to require. Furthermore, it is maintained that on the one hand knowledge that the debtor is losing his defenses is not enough and is the
"normal" feature of any acquisition of a negotiable instrument, but that
on the other hand such knowledge is sufficient where the acquirer desires to give the transferor the benefit of an escape from defenses, even
concludes, therefore, that the defenses lost by the debtor must constitute the
only means at his disposal to avoid payment which he does not owe and cannot otherwise recoup. For another, excellent exposition of a similar theory
see Bracco, La Legge Uniforme Sulla Cambiale 111-114 (1935) Bracco requires "the malicious intent to cause the damage" on the part of the holder.
73Valeri, Diritto Cambiario Italiano, Parte Generale, 305, 306 (1936).
S4See Jacobi, supra,note 59 at 87, note 5 and supra, note 69.
75Navarrini, La Cambiale e l'Assegno Bancario Secondo la Nuova Legislazione
207 (1937).
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though he knows that such benefit will accrue under all circumstances,
regardless of what he desires. It is the same knowledge in one case as
in the other. This is hardly a satisfactory interpretation.
But, just as in the German literature, there are, among Italian
scholars too, those who are not satisfied with these artificial constructions and interpret art. 17 in a much more convincing manner. Thus,
one writer points out that, where a defense actually exists (and the acquirer has knowledge of it) the detriment arising to the debtor as a
result of the purchase is evident, so that no further peculiar knowledge
of the damage is necessary.7 6 However, this writer emphasizes that it is
not enough that the acquirer merely know the circumstances out of
which a defense may arise, for example the defect of the merchandise,
because he has the right to expect that the differences between the parties will be settled. But where the controversy has actually arisen and the
buyer of the merchandise has, for example, placed it at the seller's disposal, the debtor's defense is manifest and "the indorsee cannot escape
77
by invoking his optimism."
What seems to this writer the best analysis of the problem, as seen
from the Italian viewpoint, has been supplied by another scholar.78 It
is his contention that, while the formula "acting knowingly to the detriment of the debtor" may be more precise, it means exactly the same as
"bad faith." As a rule, any holder who knows of the existence of defenses in favor of the debtor acts knowingly to the detriment of such
debtor when he acquires the instrument. A requirement of his (the
holder's) intent to cause additional damage would go beyond the content of the statute. However, the equivalence of knowledge of defenses
with knowingly acting to the debtor's detriment (hence, bad faith)
applies only in most, but not in all cases. It does not apply in the case
of accommodation parties (where knowledge that the signature was
given for accommodation does not affect the purchaser's good faith) or
76 Mossa, Trattato della Cambiale 404, 405 (3rd ed. 1956).
77Ibid. Compare the very similar analysis by Jacobi, supra, note 59, but observe
Jacobi's somewhat more liberal interpretation; Significant for Mossa's approach is the following statement at p. 405 which indicates the author's opposition to the European concept of unrestricted freedom of circulation: "After
all, the circulation of negotiable instruments need not at all costs surround
itself with mystery or silence, and the indorsee can, without detriment, inform
himself with respect to personal relationships." (Translation mine) Accord:
Lordi, Ancora sull'opponibilit al giratario di eccezioni opponibili al girante,
Riv. Dir. Comm. (Rivista di Diritto Commerciale) 1941.11.353, who emphasizes
even more strongly than Mossa that only-knowledge by the transferee of the
soundness of the debtor's defenses will bring the exception into play. (In the
same article Lordi opposes the change of the wording from "scientemente"
to "intenzionalmente," subsequently adopted by art. 1993 Cod.Civ. (1942).
7s Bigiavi, L'exceptio doli nel diritto cambiario, II Foro Italiano 1938, IV, 177
and note to Cass. (Corte di Cassazione) March 29, 1940, n. 1035, Foro It.
1940.1.1172. Similarly, Messineo, Titoli di Credito, Appendice, pp.xxii-xxim
(2d ed. 1934).
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in the case of set-off and counterclaim (where knowledge of such claims
would not expose the holder to the exception of art. 17).
Professor Bigiavi's views are supported in another contribution 9
which is distinguished by the clarity of its reasoning: Does not, the
author asks, the acquisition of an instrument with knowledge that defenses are open against it indicate that the purchaser wanted to deprive
the debtor of such defenses? Does not the mere fact that the acquirer
knew of such defenses indicate that he wished to interpose himself between the debtor and the transferor and act as a shield to paralyze the
debtor's defenses? However, the author, similar to Mossa, 0 and more
forcefully than Jacobi,"" insists that the holder must have known that
such defenses were well founded. If he knows that they are unfounded,
e.g. where he himself supplied the goods which he knew to be in perfect condition to the transferor who, in turn, sold them to the debtor
and the latter now raises the defect of the merchandise as a defense,
the holder cannot be charged with knowledge of the defense. However,
this raises the question discussed by Jacobi8 2 as to the extent to which
the holder can be expected to form an opinion as to the sufficiency in
law of a defense interposed. Professor Lordi also opposes the views held
by such writers as Angeloni and Valeri regarding the concept of "irreparable damage"8' 3 as contrary to the "clear letter of the law." He
points out quite correctly that the debtor suffers damage where he has
to pay, be it without hope of recouping the amount from someone else,
be it in the presence of such possibility which, however, may never materialize.
The two cases commented on in the notes by Professor Bigiavi and
Professor Lordi, respectively, 4 represented the fundamental view expressed by Italy's highest court, viz. that it is sufficient to expose a
holder to the defense valid against the transferor, where the former,
when acquiring the instrument, knew that the debtor could have successfully interposed defenses against the transferor and that the latter
divested himself of the instrument for the purpose of evading such defenses.
However, the same court has radically changed its position, possibly
because of the enactment of art. 1993 Code Civ. (1942) which substituted the word "intenzionalmente" (intentionally) for the word "scientemente" (knowingly) in the law governing negotiable instruments.
Before discussing the later court decisions, we shall have to turn our
7s Lordi, Note to Cass. April 3, 1940, n. 1062, Riv. Dir. Comm. 1940.11.277.
80 Supra, note 76.
s1 Supra, note 59.

.Ibid.
83 Supra, note 72 and note 73.

s Cass. March 29, 1940, supra note 78 and Cass. April 3, 1940, supra note 79.
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attention to the question as to whether or not art. 1993 Cod. Civ. is to
be considered as interpretative of art. 21 I.c.
It has been claimed that art. 1993 of the new Civil Code of 1942
contains an "authentic interpretation of art. 21 .c."8'5 This would mean
that the legislator has interpreted the wording of the article to the effect
that actual, malicious intent on the part of the holder to cause damage
to the debtor is required, in order to subject the former to defenses of
the latter directed against the holder's predecessors. However, such a
conclusion would violate both a provision of national Italian law and an
international agreement to which Italy is a signatory: 1. Art. 2001 Cod.
Civ. provides expressly that the rules of Tit. V (which contains the new
art. 1993) apply only absent contrary provisions "of this Code or of
special laws."86 The law of Negotiable Instruments being such a special
law, there is no foundation for the assumption that art. 1993 is an authentic interpretation of art. 21 l.c. 8 7 2. The laws of Negotiable Instru-

ments enacted by the signatories of the Geneva Convention are national
laws, but based on an international agreement. If the wording of art.
1993 Code Civ. constitutes a change or abrogation of art. 21 l.c., such
would, without a formal rescission of the treaty, amount to a violation
of an international agreement.3 8
However, the new wording has nevertheless had a considerable impact on the interpretation of art. 21 l.c., amounting to an "authentic
interpretation" de facto if not de jure. This influence is obvious from
a study of decisions of the Corte di Cassazione since 1953."9 The Court
now requires for the application of the exception of art. 21 1.c. "a fraudulent program to damage the debtor, with the intent to impede the
debtor's defenses by depriving him of such defenses which he could
have interposed against the preceding holder and in the knowledge of
the resulting damage which such debtor would suffer."90 The Court recognizes that the debtor will have great difficulties in proving intent on
the part of the holder, but asserts that the proof can be obtained through
"presumptions derived from objective circumstances which will serve
85Angeloni, La Cambiale e il Vaglia Cambiario 243 (3d ed. 1949).

"Le norme di questo titolo si applicano in quanto non sia diversamente disposto da altre norme di questo codice o di leggi speciali."
87 See De Semo, supra note 72 at 47, note (2); Ascarelli, Legge cambiaria a
codice civile, Banca, Borsa, e Titoli di Credito 1955.1.443,447; Trimarchi,
L'incapacit naturale ed il negozio cambiario, Banca Borsa, e Titoli di
Credito 1955.1.287, 308.
ss See Ascarelli, Legge cambiaria e codice civile, supra, note 87.
s9 Cass. July 9, 1953, n. 2205, Banca, Borsa e Titoli di Credito 1954.11.45; Cass
October 15, 1954, n. 3715, Banca, Borsa e Titoli di Credito 1955.11.284; Cass.
October 28, 1955, n. 3542, Banca, Borsa e Titoli di Credito 1956.11.165. Observe that a footnote to Cass. October 15, 1954 points out that in that case
the Supreme Court seems to adhere impliedly to the view that art. 1993
Cod. Civ. is "an authentic interpretation of art. 21 1.c." (legge cambiaria).
90
Bianchi d'Espinosa, Le Leggi Cambiarie nella Giurisprudenza dell'ultimo
Ventennio 214 (1957).
86
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to ascertain the planned and fraudulent behavior." 91 Yet the same court,
only a short time before, considered the test of intent to damage the
debtor satisfied where the buyer advised the acquirer, prior to the endorsement of the instrument from the seller to the acquirer, that the
merchandise for which the instrument was issued was defective or that
the indorser had breached the contract and the holder nevertheless acquired the instrument. 92 Does not that mean that notice of existing defenses alone is sufficient to destroy the acquirer's good faith?
SUMMARY

The conclusion seems justified that the interpretation of art. 17 U.L.
by the courts and writers of France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland
and Italy is contradictory and, in each of these countries, in a state of
confusion. The formula adopted at Geneva (acting knowingly to the
detriment of the debtor) was intended as a compromise between an
entente frauduleuse and plain, bad faith as criteria for the determination of the holder's position with respect to personal defenses valid
against a transferor. The formula did not work satisfactorily, as foreseen at Geneva, if for no other reason than simply because, in the great
majority of cases, where the acquirer of an instrument knows that the
debtor has valid defenses against a transferor, he also knows that, by
cutting off these defenses, he is acting "to the detriment of the debtor"
and should refuse to acquire the instrument. In other words, he knows
"something is wrong" and, therefore, cannot be acting in good faith.
Thus, in spite of various tortured interpretations by courts and writers
alike, the basic criterion still remains that of good or bad faith and courts
will still, in spite of the various artificial circumlocutions, consider
knowledge of existing defenses as incompatible with the requirement of
good faith which is essential in both European and Anglo-American law.
The adoption of the formula as a qualification of bad faith was
dictated mainly by the desire to preserve the free circulation of the
instrument, for which it is designed. But it has never been doubted that
somewhere the line had to be drawn to exclude the bad faith purchaser
from an over-generous protection. The line was drawn with the words
of the formula, mainly with the intent to exclude specifically undesirable effects, e.g. situations where the purchaser is aware of a right of
set-off or counterclaim on the part of the debtor against a transferor or
where he knows that the obligation was assumed for the accommodation of another party. While the exclusion of a presumption of bad
faith in those cases is valid, the purpose could have been accomplished
by explicit statutory language. Moreover, it seems likely that the formula was intended to exclude knowledge of the non-fulfillment of an
91 Ibid. citing Cass. October 15, 1954, supra, note 89.
92 Cass. August 30, 1952, n. 2795 Massimario Giurisprudenza Italiana 1952, 747.
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executory contract as a criterion of bad faith, another problem with
which the Anglo-American law has dealt adequately, without abandoning the criterion of plain, bad faith.
The balance of this article will be devoted to a brief survey of AngloAmerican law on this point, which might provide us with a perspective
for evaluation.
England
A separate investigation of English law covering our problem could
have been omitted, because the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882 (after
which our Negotiable Instruments Law was fashioned) and its interpretation do not appear to provide anything substantially different from
American law on this point.
However, a brief statement is in order because of a somewhat
puzzling remark attributed to Prof. H. C. Gutteridge, the representative
of Great Britain at the Geneva Convention. He is quoted as having
stated that "the Anglo-Saxon law requires something in the nature of
the 'entente frauduleuse.' If he were to be asked what he would wish,
he would answer immediately 'entente frauduleuse,' the only thing which
could satisfy him, because it is the one which approaches the AngloSaxon law most closely." 93
This writer does not know whether or not Professor Gutteridge was
cited correctly and suspects that his remark is based on a misunderstanding, either on his part or on that of the other members of the conference or of the translator or other person. However, since then
numerous European scholars have quoted that statement as authoritatively interpreting English law. 94 Nevertheless, nothing could be found
to support such an interpretation. Sec. 29 (1) and (2) of the Bills of
Exchange Act corresponds to sec. 52 and 55 of the American N.I.L.
Both deny the position of a holder in due course to a holder who had
9
notice of a defect in title of the person who negotiated it.
In fact, English authors and cases indicate that notice which destroys
the holder in due course qualification can be either "of the particular
facts avoiding the bill" 96 or even "General or implied notice where the
holder had notice that there was some illegality or some fraud vitiating
the bill, though he may not have been apprised of its precise nature."'9 7
93 C.R. p. 294.
94 E.g. Hupka, supra note 6 at 52, note 1; Bayalovitch, La Loi Uniforme de
Geneve et le Droit Uniforme Anglo-Am6ricani 294, note 21 (1935); Friedel,

supranote 8 at 158, 159 and many others.

95 §52(4) N.I.L. adds to the words "defect in title ...." of the BEA the words
"any infirmity in the instrument." That both terms mean "all equities and defenses" is convincingly explained by BRIToN, LAW OF BiLLs Alm Noms 259
(2d ed. 1961).
96 BLEs,BILLS oF EXCEIANGE 154 (21st ed. 1955) citing Midland Bank v. Reckitt
/1933/ A.C. 1, 19.
97 Ibid. citing Oakley v. Oedeen /1861/ 2 F & F 656; May v. Chapman /1847/
16 M & W 355; Raphael v. Bank of England /1855/ 17 C.B. 161.
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Or, as another author put it: "'Notice' means actual, though not formal
notice, that is to say, either knowledge of the facts, or a suspicion of
something wrong, combined with a willful disregard of the means of
knowledge."98
Thus, there appears to be no foundation for the assumption that a
fraudulent conspiracy between the transferor and the holder comes even
near to being the only English criterion for subjecting the latter to personal defenses open as against the former.
United States.
Before discussing the American law dealing with our problem, it
seems advisable to restate one proposition: Both the European and the
American law of Negotiable Instruments recognize the necessity of free
circulation of the paper. Both, therefore, protect the purchaser of such
an instrument to a considerable extent. But both agree that only a purchaser in good faith should be protected. 99 Where they seem to differ
is only as to the line of demarcation between good and bad faith.
The experts who prepared the Geneva Convention, considering the
words "entente frauduleuse" as too narrow, substituted the words "mauvaise foi" (bad faith)' which, if adopted, would have been left to the
interpretation of the courts. Instead, the Geneva U.L. qualified the concept of bad faith through the formula of "acting knowingly to the detriment of the debtor," leaving the interpretation of the formula to the
discretion of the courts.' 0'
It is this writer's belief that fewer difficulties would have been encountered if the Committee of Experts' recommendations had been followed, which was, in essence, the way chosen by the American law.
The appearance of difference in approach to our problem between
the American and European law vanishes when we realize 1. that, as
shown before, many European courts and writers, while paying lipservice to the unworkable formula, still determine our problem on the
basis of the holder's bad faith which may be reflected in his acquiring
the instrument with knowledge of existing defenses and 2. that the interpretation of "knowledge" and "notice" as evolved in the U.S. gives
ample protectioh to the person whom each legal system wishes to protect, viz. the European bona fide purchaser and the American holder in
due course.
1. The N.I.L.
The statutory source governing the question of the acquirer's good
or bad faith is found in sec. 52(3) and (4) and sec. 56. In order to qual98 CHALMERS, BILLS OF EXCHANGE 90, 91 (12th ed. 1952).
99 The distinction between the European bona fide purchaser and the Anglo-

American holder in due course is beyond the scope of this article.

100 Supra, note 12.
10, Supra, note 18.
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ify as a holder in due course, the holder must, in addition to fulfilling
other requirements, have taken the instrument in good faith and without notice, at the time of acquisition, of any infirmity in the instrument
or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. Notice is then defined
as "actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
Thus, the N.I.L. does not define good faith, while giving a general,
and not very exhaustive, definition of bad faith- Hence, it has been
always, before and since the N.I.L., the task of courts and juries to
determine under what circumstances the holder acts in bad faith and,
as a consequence, loses the protection of freedom from personal defenses.
It took English and American courts more than a century to evolve
some concept of bad faith and its varying interpretation shows their
concern for the rights of the parties and for the preservation of free
circulation of negotiable paper. These variations in interpretation make
it rather understandable that the delegates to the Geneva Convention
hesitated to adopt the experts' criterion of "mauvaise foi" and attempted
to restrict it in some manner. But the "uncertainty as to what facts constitute bad faith cannot be eliminated. And, if certainty could be made
to replace uncertainty, the law would probably not be as well off as it
is now."' 10 2 However, the historical development of the bad faith rule
shows a definite trend in the same direction as that of the European law:
toward greater protection of the holder of the instrument. 10 3 This principle was recognized as early as 1801,104 overruled by the rule that "suspicious circumstances" at the time of acquisition are sufficient to impute
bad faith to the purchaser 105 and restored in England in 1836,100 when
gross negligence ceased to be equated to bad faith. In this country, while
at first subject to conflicting decisions, the rule that only factual knowledge of the infirmity or defect of the instrument or the holder's deliberate "shutting his eyes" to facts establishing such infirmity will constitute notice, was firmly entrenched by sec. 52(4) N.I.L. and the decisions interpreting it.1 °7 "If

the facts known to him are sufficient to

create the belief or the unavoidable inference that the infirmity exists,
Britton, supra,note 95 at 247.
103 For an excellent presentation of that history, see Rightmire, The Doctrine of
Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 18 MICH. L. REV. 355
(1920).
104 Lawson v. Weston /1801/4 Esq. 56.
105 Gill v. Cubit /1824/ 3 B & C 466.
IoG Goodman v. Harvey /1836/ 4 Ad. & El. 870.
102

107

Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110 (1864) ; Joseph v. Lesnevich, 56 N.J.S. 362,

153 A2d 349 (1959) (suspicious circumstances are of only probative value
to prove active bad faith) ; Henry v. Zachry Co., 92 S.E. 225 (93 Ga. App.
536 (1956) (the mere fact that check had written thereon "car to be free
and clear of liens" would not give indorsee notice that consideration had
failed or might fail in the future). See also Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin,
63 So.2d 649, 44 A.L.R.2d 1, 97 et seq. (Fla. 1953) and infra, note 109.
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his buying is dishonest dealing toward the defendant."'' 0 It is submitted
that this statement is by far preferable to "acting knowingly to the detriment of the debtor" and yet expresses approximately the same thought.
If the concept of bad faith, even though not rigorously formulated, had
evolved in a similar fashion in Europe, the opposition to the adoption
of the simpler test of "mauvaise foi" might have been less successful.
Between the criterion of gross negligence prevailing in France and that
of an "entente frauduleuse" current in Germany, the test of plain, bad
faith might have been a far better workable compromise.
How careful some American courts were in emphasizing the limit
of knowledge on the part of the holder, might be illustrated by this statement of a number of state and federal courts: "The holder is not bound
at his peril to be on the alert for circumstances which might possibly
excite the suspicion of wary vigilance. He does not owe the party who
puts the paper afloat the duty of active inquiry in order to avert the
imputation of bad faith. The rights of the holder are to be determined
faith, and not by a speculative
by the simple test of honesty and good
09
issue as to his diligence or negligence."'
Where a note was given in consideration for a sale of cemetery land
which required the permission of the town and the holder of the note
knew of such restraint and that, at the time of negotiation, it had not
been obtained, but had reason to believe that it would be obtained, he
was held nevertheless to have acquired in good faith. 110 This case seems
to be very much in point with the hypothetical used at the Geneva Conference, where one of the delegates insisted that personal defenses
should not be let in against a holder who had similar reasons to believe
that the difficulties between the drawer and drawee would be straightened out by the time of maturity of the instrument."' The American
court reached the same result in spite of the apparent difference in legal
provisions.
American courts have also consistently held that notice of an executory term of the contract underlying a negotiable instrument would not
destroy the holder's good faith where the breach of such term occurred
subsequently.1

2

supra note 103 at 376.
THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 68 (3d ed. 1908); Gray v.
Boyle, 55 Wash. 578, 104 Pac. 828 (1909) ; Manufacturers' and Traders' T. Co.
v. Sapovitch, 296 N.Y. 226, 72 N.E.2d 166 (1947) ; Magee v. Badger, 34 N.Y.
247, 249, 90 Am.D. 691 (1866); Hall v. Bank of Blasdell, 306 N.Y. 336, 118
N.E.2d 465 (1954) ; State of the Netherlands v. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. 201
F2d 455 (1953); First Ntl. Bank of Odessa v. Fazzari, 10 N.Y.2d 394, 223
N.Y.S.2d 483 (1961) ; Securities Inv. Co. v. R. 0. Cohen, 241 Miss. 549, 131 So.
2d 439 (1961) ; Local Finance Co. v. Charlton, 289 S.W.2d 157 (1956) ; In re
Stroudsburg Security Trust Co. v. Heller's Estate, 145 Pa. S.44, 20 A2d 890
(1941).
110 Markovitz v. Swartz, 264 Mass. 392, 162 N.E. 898 (1928).
108 Rightmire,
109 CRAWFORD,

11 Supra, note 15 and 39.

112 Thal v. Credit Alliance Corp. 78 F.2d 212, 100 A.L.R. 1354 (1935). The An-
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In yet another case the court held that, where the instrument was
negotiated to a holder on May 31, 1957 and he then knew that the contract under which the instrument had been issued contained the words:
"Install by May 15, 1957," such knowledge did not preclude him from
13
becoming a holder in due course."

Again, it may well be that the supporters of the compromise formula
at Geneva would have been satisfied with the adoption of a "mauvaise
foi" rule, if notice of executory contract terms had been excluded as a
criterion of bad faith.
As pointed out previously, one of the motivating factors for the
rejection of "knowledge of defenses" as a criterion of bad faith was the
fear that knowledge by the purchaser that the debtor was an accommodating party would expose him to the defense based on accommodation. Sec. 29 specifically exempts such knowledge from the consequences
of bad faith purchase and American courts have sustained that principle
universally."14 One state supreme court stated with reference to sec. 29
N.I.L.: "To permit a party who places his name on such paper for the
purpose of lending credit to another to interpose want of consideration
as a defense against a holder who took it for value would defeat the
very purpose for which accommodation paper is usually given .... ,5
A similar provision in the U.L. would have been a sufficient safeguard
to obviate an undesirable result.
On the other hand, the question as to whether set-off and counterclaim may be interposed by the debtor against a holder not in due course,
was not clearly answered by the N.I.L. or by the courts interpreting it.
The problem of set-off is, generally, governed by state statutes. That
the framers of sec. 58 N.I.L., which exposes a holder not in due course
to the same defenses as if the instrument were non-negotiable, did not
mean to include set-off and counterclaim among the equities interposable
against the holder, seems clear." 6 However, the courts differ widely on
notation states at 1359: "The fact that the consideration is an executory
contract of purchase, and that the indorsee has notice of the terms of the
contract at the time of the transfer of the note, do not prevent him from
being a bona fide holder for value before maturity, unless there has been
a breach of the contract to the knowledge of such indorsee . . . ." Accd:
Whitehall Realty Corp. v. Manuf. Trust Co., 100 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1958);
Ed Steves & Sons Inc. v. Lippman, 254 S.W.2d 184 (C.C.A. Texas 1952);
N. J. Mortgage and Investment Corp. v. Calvetti, 68 N.J. Super. 18, 171
A.2d 321 (1961); First & Lumbermen's Natl. Bank of Chippewa Falls v.
Buchholz, 270 Minn. 97, 18 N.W.2d 771 (1945) ; Rubio Say. Bank of Brighton
v. Acme Farm Products Co., 240 Iowa 457, 37 N.W.2d 16, 9 A.L.R.2d 459
(1949) ; Smith v. Ellis, 142 Miss. 444, 107 So. 669 (1926).
"31 Ntl. Bank of Franklin Square v. Kinsey, 17 Misc.2d 632, 183 N.Y.S.2d 891
(1959).
"14 See National City Bank v. Parr, 205 Ind. 108, 185 N.E. 904, 95 A.L.R. 958
(1933) and Annotation 964 et seq.
15 Grisim v. Live Stock State Bank, 167 Minn. 93, 208 N.W. 805 (1920).
116 See Commissioner's Note in BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, Part
I, p. 142 (a) (7th ed. 1948) and Beutel, Problems of Interpretation under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, 27 NFB. L. REv. 485, 500 (1948).
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this question. Some courts state that a right of set-off against the payee
of a promissory note by the maker is not an infirmity in the instrument,
so that a holder who knew of a set-off at the time of purchase would not
thereby lose his standing as a holder in due course. 117 Nevertheless,
many courts will allow a claim of set-off against one not a holder in due
course, provided such claim had matured before the transfer of the instrument,"" and will deny interposition of such a claim if it arose subsequent to the transfer. On the other hand, the courts in some jurisdictions refuse to allow a claim of "set-off arising out of collateral and
wholly independent matters," even if "the indorsee had notice, gave no
consideration for, and took the paper on purpose to defeat the off-set."119
Moreover, where the holder knows that a set-off or counterclaim may
arise before maturity of the instrument, many courts will consider such
knowledge immaterial. As one court put it: "Every purchaser of a
promissory note knows that, as between the maker and the payee, there
may, before the note matures, arise a set-off or counterclaim in favor
of the maker, but this will not prevent the purchaser from being a
holder in due course, nor is the fact of itself evidence of bad faith in
purchasing."

120

From the above discussion it may be deduced that, under the reign
of the N.I.L. the holder not in due course might be exposed to set-off
or counterclaim under circumstances under which he would not have to
contend with such defenses under the European U.L. The UCC has attempted to clarify the situation and to provide for an implementation
of what even the N.I.L. originally intended, namely relief of the holder
from such "defenses," even if he knew of their existence.
2. The Uniform Commercial Code
A discussion of the differences between the N.I.L. and the UCC
would exceed the scope of this article. 211 However, it may be said, generally, that the UCC clarifies a number of problems connected with the
interpretation of "due course holding." Sec. 3-302 and sections 3-304
and 3-305 UCC are the statutory courses dealing with our question.
Sec. 3-302(1) (c) makes it clear that a purchaser with notice of any
defense against or claim to the instrument on the part of any person
is not a holder in due course and will, by virtue of sec. 3-306 be exposed to such defenses, including the defense of failure of consideration
mentioned specifically in sec. 3-306(c).
Edge v. Stuckey, 42 Ohio App. 462, 182 N.E. 517 (1932); Williams v. Brown,
41 N.Y. 486 (1866).
118 See Morris, The Use of Set-off, Counterclaim and Recoupment: Availability
against Commercial Paper, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 141, 158 (1959).
119 Davis v. Noll, 38 W.Va. 66, 17 S.E. 791 (1893).
.20 Elmo State Bank of Elmo v. Hildebrand, 103 Kan. 705, 177 Pac. 6 (1918);
Advance Rumely Thresher Co. v. West, 108 Kan. 875, 196 Pac. 1061 (1921).
121 For such a discussion see Britton, Holder in due course: comparison of NIL
provisions with Art. 3 of proposed Commercial Code, 49 Nw. U. L. REv. 417
(1954).
117
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But the UCC is careful in circumscribing all the terms used with the
utmost precision possible. Thus, sec. 1-201(25) provides that a person
has "notice" where he has actual knowledge of a fact or has received
a notice or notification of it or has reason to know that it exists from
all the facts and circumstances known to him. It seems clear that "suspicious circumstances" are not enough to constitute notice under the
statute. Sec. 3-304(4) indicates more specifically when knowledge of
certain facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice of a defense or
claim. Of particular interest for our problem is the provision of subsection (b) of the cited section to the effect that knowledge that the
instrument was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise
or accompanied by a separate agreement, does not constitute notice of
a defense, unless the purchaser has notice that a defense or claim has
arisen from the terms thereof .12

Sec. 3-304(1) (b) would seem to clarify the previously debated question of set-off and counterclaim. The statute provides that the purchaser
is considered to have notice of a claim or defense only if the instrument
shows certain defects as indicated in subsection (a) or he has notice that
the obligation of any party is voidable in whole or in part, or that all
parties have been discharged. The official comment to this provision
states: "'Voidable' obligation in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) is intended to limit the provision to notice of defense which will permit any
party to avoid his original obligation on the instrument, as distinguished
from a set-off or counterclaim.'

123

That knowledge by a holder (for value and before maturity) of the
fact that an obligation was assumed for accommodation does not affect
the accommodation party's liability, has been reiterated by the UCC in
sec. 3-415.
CONCLUSION

Today it is hardly open to question that widest possible uniformity
among the legal systems of our shrinking world is desirable. In the area
of commercial law such uniformity should encounter fewer obstacles
than in other fields, because of the common ground furnished by certain
principles of the law merchant. Nevertheless, attempts at unifying the
law of Negotiable Instruments have been only partially successful.
Even in this narrow area, fundamental differences in concepts of the
Civil as compared to the Anglo-American law prevent unification. But
this does not mean that unification will never be accomplished. If comThis wording appears to correspond closely to the views held by Mossa,
supra note 76 with respect to the interpretation of the formula of art. 17
U.L. Note also that New York has added subsection (7) to sec. 3-304 UCC,
the first part of which reads: "In any event, to constitute notice of a claim
or defense, the purchaser must have knowledge of the claim or defense or
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts
to bad faith."
23
'
But cf. Britton, supra,note 95 at 437.
122
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plete unanimity cannot be achieved, recent efforts to arrive at an agreement in the creation of an international negotiable instrument, valid only
in international trade and fulfilling the prerequisites on which uniformity could be reached only if such paper did not circulate internally,
might meet with success. In the meantime, comparison will help us
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of our own legal provisions,
which is one of the aims of Comparative Law.
In this writer's opinion, the wording of art. 17 of the Uniform Law
on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes adopted at Geneva does
not compare favorably with the provisions of American law. As has
been shown, the formula "acting knowingly to the detriment of the
debtor" establishing a prerequisite for the opening up of personal defenses against the holder of a negotiable instrument, has not worked
well in the practice of European courts and has been the subject of
much controversy among European legal writers. It appears that acceptance of knowledge or ignorance of existing defenses as a criterion
of good faith purchase is preferable and has actually been practiced by
many European courts, even though sometimes camouflaged behind the
wording of art. 17 U.L. The apprehension that special situations, such
as accommodation obligations and set-off and counterclaim, might be
solved unsatisfactorily if knowledge of defenses were adopted as a
criterion of bad faith, could have been dispelled by specific provisions,
such as those adopted by the UCC and established, prior to it, by many
American courts.
There are a number of fundamental principles in the Civil and the
Anglo-American law of Bills of Exchange which cannot be reconciled.
This writer believes that the availability of personal defenses against a
holder is not one of them.

